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Abstract
An active area of public health policy in the United States is policy 
meant to promote healthy eating, reduce overconsumption of food, 
and prevent overweight/obesity.  Public discussion of such obesity 
prevention policies includes intense ethical disagreement. We 
suggest that some ethical disagreements about obesity prevention 
policies can be seen as rooted in a common concern with equality or 
with autonomy, but there are disagreements about which dimensions 
of equality or autonomy have priority, and about whether it is 
justifiable for policies to diminish equality or autonomy along one 
dimension in order to increase it along another dimension.  We 
illustrate this point by discussing ethical disagreements about two 
obesity prevention policies. 
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Obesity prevention and ethics in the United States  
In the United States, growing concern about the negative health 
effects of unhealthy eating, overweight and obesity, as well as 
concern about the financial costs of treating diet-related illness, 
have prompted policy efforts to promote healthier eating. The 
federal government, as well as state and local governments, have 
proposed and implemented a variety of policies meant to increase 
consumption of healthy food and reduce overconsumption of 
unhealthy food (1–3).  Policies that limit access to unhealthy food 
have proven especially controversial. Examples of such policies 
include bans on the use of trans fat in restaurants (4), nutritional 
requirements for fast food meals marketed as children’s meals 
(the “Happy Meal ban”) (5), policies limiting the density of fast 
food restaurants (6), proposals to exclude unhealthy food from 
food assistance programs (7), proposed taxes on sugary drinks 
(8), and a proposal by New York City to limit the sale of large 
sugary drinks (9).
Ethicists, public health experts, social scientists, and advocates 
have all raised ethical concerns with these policies, as well as 
making ethical arguments for these policies (10–14). Public 
discussion of these policies has often been phrased in ethical 
terms, using ethical concepts such as fairness, equality, respect, 
legitimacy, paternalism, infantilization, liberty, and freedom; 
the popular press articles we cite in this paper give just a few 
examples, and a Google search could provide dozens more.  We 
suggest that many of the ethical arguments for and against obesity 
prevention policies can be seen as distinct threads of two core 
ethical concerns: ethical concern with individual autonomy, and 
ethical concern with equality. Furthermore, ethical disagreement 
about obesity prevention policies can be seen, in many cases, as 
rooted in a common concern with equality or with autonomy, but 
disagreement about which dimensions of equality or autonomy 
have priority, and disagreement about whether it is justifiable 
for government policies to diminish equality or autonomy along 
one dimension in order to increase it along another dimension. 
We illustrate this point by discussing ethical disagreement about 
two obesity prevention policies, taxes on unhealthy food and the 
New York City soda ban. 
Equality and obesity prevention policy
Some objections to obesity prevention policies use the language 
of equality and fairness, and related concepts. For example, a 
common objection to food taxes is that they are regressive and 
therefore unfair (15). To give another example, proposals to 
exclude unhealthy foods from food assistance programs have 
been objected to as unfairly targeting program participants, as 
inequitable, demeaning, and stigmatizing (13).
The language of equality and fairness is used to capture a 
range of ethical concerns (13). One dimension of equality is 
distributive equality or distributive justice. Distributive equality 
is concerned with the resources and opportunities individuals 
have at their disposal, and the life outcomes they achieve. Certain 
distributions of resources, opportunities or life outcomes are 
considered fair, whereas other distributions are considered 
unfair. 
Some ethical disagreement about specific policies can be seen as 
rooted in a common concern with distributive equality—that is, 
a common concern with ensuring that there is a fair distribution 
of resources, opportunities and outcomes—but disagreement 
about what it is that must be fairly distributed.  In the context 
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of obesity prevention policy, we might be concerned about a 
fair distribution of multiple things, including: health, income, 
financial access to healthy food, geographic access to healthy 
food, and consumer choice. The status quo is that, none of these 
things are equally distributed across the population in the United 
States. Instead, there are inequalities in health and income across 
racial, ethnic, and geographic groups, and inequalities between 
income groups in access to healthy food as well as other essential 
goods. Specific policies could help to create a more equal or more 
fair distribution of one thing (e.g. health) while exacerbating the 
unequal distribution of something else (e.g. income). In such 
cases, people might disagree about whether it is acceptable to 
exacerbate inequality along one dimension in order to diminish 
inequality along another dimension. 
For example, one ethical objection to taxes on unhealthy food 
is that these taxes are regressive—that is, they take a larger share 
of the income of lower income people—and are unfair for this 
reason (15). Simultaneously, an argument given in favour of 
taxes on unhealthy food is that they will help to alleviate health 
disparities (i.e. the higher rates of obesity and diet-related 
illness among lower income people), precisely because they 
disproportionately impact low income people. As one proponent 
of taxes on soda put it, “The soda tax would help low-income 
residents by encouraging them to choose healthier beverages 
and by creating more grocery stores and jobs in low-income 
neighborhoods. A soda tax is a public health policy that helps 
improve the quality of life for low-income residents. Obesity is 
a regressive disease” (16). Both opponents and proponents of 
such taxes are concerned with the fair distribution of something, 
but opponents prioritize the fair distribution of income while 
opponent prioritize the fair distribution of health. In other 
words, proponents and opponents disagree about which 
demands of distributive equality have priority. 
In our opinion, regressive taxes can be ethically justifiable, and 
the soda tax is a good example. Regressive taxes are ubiquitous. 
General sales tax, tobacco taxes, alcohol taxes, and taxes on 
public utilities are all taxes that take a higher percentage of the 
income of lower income people; tobacco taxes are especially 
regressive, taking seven times more of the income of the poorest 
20% than the richest 20% of people (17).  Flat fees for public 
services are also regressive. Progressive income tax compensates 
to some extent for specific regressive taxes, and the fact that 
a specific tax is regressive is not usually considered a decisive 
argument against it. 
A notable exception is tax on groceries, a regressive tax 
that is widely opposed as such. Most states have no sales tax 
on groceries: Of the 45 states in the United States that have a 
general sales tax, 31 states do not levy sales tax on groceries, 
and seven states tax groceries at a lower rate (18).  At the same 
time, however, most states that do not tax groceries do tax sodas, 
and several tax candy (18,19). This pattern of taxes reveals a 
recognized distinction between foods that are necessities and 
therefore should not be subject to a regressive tax (i.e. groceries), 
and other things we eat, like soda, candy and restaurant food, 
that are clearly non-necessities and thus may be fairly subjected 
to a regressive tax.
Autonomy and obesity prevention policy
Just as some disagreements about obesity prevention policies 
are rooted in disagreement about which demands of distributive 
equality have priority, other disagreements are rooted in a 
common concern with individual autonomy but differing views 
about which dimensions of autonomy have priority. 
Simply put, autonomy is as a self-rule (20) (of course, things 
are not quite this simple, as philosophers recognize multiple 
distinct notions of autonomy) (21). To be autonomous, one 
must be free of control by others, have control over oneself, and 
understand what one’s doing. Thus being autonomous—making 
autonomous choices and engaging in autonomous actions—
requires being free from control by others (liberty), having the 
psychological capacity to make choices and act on them, and 
understanding the available courses of action and their effects. 
All three dimensions of autonomy—liberty, psychological 
capacity, and understanding—come in degrees.  For example, 
the psychological capacity to make choices and act on them lies 
along a spectrum, from the minimal capacity to have preferences 
and act on them, to the capacity to make informed choices, to the 
capacity to build a life that conforms with one’s values and goals 
(e.g. the goal to maintain a healthy weight and stay healthy). In 
the context of food and eating, there are multiple ways in which 
the three dimensions of autonomy—liberty, psychological 
capacity and understanding—can be compromised: 
•	Liberty/freedom from external constraints. Liberty is 
diminished by constraints and penalties on choice and 
action.  Examples of such constraints and penalties are 
product bans and taxes. 
•	Understanding of the available options and how they impact 
one’s interests.  This understanding can be diminished by 
lack of information, as well as the confusing presentation of 
information in food advertising, food marketing, and food 
labelling (22–24).
•	Psychological capacity to make choices and act on them. 
Our psychological capacity to control our eating, rather than 
eating more than we would like or eating less healthfully 
than we would like, can be diminished by multiple 
factors: psychological factors such as food addiction, 
social influences such as social norms encouraging 
overconsumption and environmental influences such as 
the prevalence of unhealthy food (25–28). Psychological 
capacity can also be diminished by the simple lack of time 
and energy to make the best choices.
When people have robust autonomy vis-à-vis food, this allows 
them to make food choices for themselves and their families that 
are pleasurable and healthy, that express their personal identities 
and cultural affiliations, and that conform with their personal 
values. The robust exercise of food autonomy can promote 
health (though of course, people may also autonomously choose 
to eat unhealthily), whereas diminished food autonomy can 
compromise health. Acting autonomously is considered ethically 
valuable because of its good consequences for individuals, 
families, communities and societies. We exercise our autonomy 
as individuals, as we build lives for ourselves and our loved ones, 
and we also exercise our autonomy as members of groups, as 
we together build communities and societies. But autonomy is 
also seen by some as a moral good in and of itself, and violating 
someone’s autonomy is seen as a moral wrong in and of itself, 
whether or not it has good or bad consequences (20,29).
The ethical value of food autonomy provides both ethical 
reasons against policies—when those policies compromise 
autonomy along a dimension—and ethical reasons for healthy 
eating policies—when those policies strengthen autonomy 
along a dimension. A single policy could compromise autonomy 
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along one dimension while strengthening it along another; or 
compromise autonomy in a surface way while strengthening it 
in a deeper sense (20). As an example, consider the New York 
City big soda ban, a controversial policy passed by the New York 
City Board of Health but subsequently ruled unconstitutional, 
and hence never implemented (30). According to the ban, sodas 
and certain other sugary drinks larger than 16 ounces may 
not be sold in restaurants, corner stores, and many other food 
establishments in New York City (31). The ban was intended to 
reduce consumption of sugary drinks, thereby reducing rates of 
obesity and diabetes. 
The ban has been criticized on multiple grounds, both 
empirical and practical. One strain of ethical criticism is that 
the soda ban would unduly restricting consumer choice, violate 
consumers’ right to choose, and limit personal freedom (32–
34). By preventing sellers from offering certain products (i.e. 
sugary drinks larger than 16 ounces) and preventing consumers 
from purchasing these products, the soda ban would diminish 
individual autonomy along one dimension: it would diminish 
individual liberty and freedom from external constraint. At 
the same time, proponents of the soda ban could argue that it 
will increase individual autonomy along another dimension, 
by increasing individuals’ psychological capacity to make good 
choices. As Hunter and Van Busum argue: 
“When it comes to selecting a drink size, we often choose 
quickly and reflexively. But when we are not distracted by the 
option of buying a 32-ounce or larger soda, we have the chance 
to stop and think—just for a second—about how much we 
actually want. How many calories do we want to take in? How 
much money do we want to spend? If it turns out that what 
we want is 32 ounces of soda, then we can buy two 16-ounce 
containers. The ban on excessive single-serving beverages takes 
the home field advantage away from soda companies and gives 
consumers the opportunity to consider their real preferences. 
So rather than obstructing freedom of choice, the big-container 
ban actually enhances it” (35).
By making us pause and reflect upon our soda consumption, 
the soda ban could enhance our psychological capacity to 
make good choices about what we drink. In limiting the 
options available to consumers, the soda ban simultaneously 
reduces individual autonomy along one dimension (liberty) 
while perhaps bolstering autonomy along another dimension 
(psychological capacity). We can see some disagreement about 
the soda ban as disagreement about whether it is appropriate 
for government policy to limit autonomy along one dimension 
(liberty) in order to bolster it along another dimension 
(psychological capacity). 
In our opinion, it can be ethically appropriate to limit the 
available consumer options in order to facilitate better decision-
making (that is, limit liberty in order to bolster psychological 
capacity). It can also be ethically appropriate to limit the available 
consumer options in order to achieve other goods—for example, 
improving health or aligning consumer choices with people’s 
long-term goals—even if these limitations do not also improve 
decision-making. As ethicist Sarah Conly puts it: “We do not 
think preserving your autonomy, your freedom to act based 
on your own decision, is worth the costs, in part because your 
decision making is done so badly that your freedom is used very 
poorly” (36). However, such limitations of consumer choice will 
have to be justified on a case by case basis, taking into account 
the range of ways in which limiting the consumer option has 
value for individuals (for example, bolstering decision-making 
or improving health) as well as all the ways in which limiting it 
has disvalue (for example, limiting liberty or preventing valuable 
experiences). 
Conclusion
In the United States, public discussion of obesity prevention 
policies is often acrimonious and riven with ethical disagreement. 
We would like to suggest that some of these disagreements are 
rooted in common concern with both equality and autonomy, 
but there are disagreements about which dimensions of equality 
and autonomy have priority.  Perhaps recognition of our shared 
ethical concerns could help us make progress on resolving the 
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